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Forming A Single
A Recipe for Success for New

1Entity: Professional Sports Leagues

Karen Jordan
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other hand, addresses actual practices that effectively
The women of the WUSA are not alone; the new milrestrain trade, such as price discrimination, while prolenium marks the beginning for several new sports
viding the remedies of injunctive relief and damages for
leagues. For instance, the World Wrestling Federation's
any anti-competitive act under either the Sherman or
(WWF's) Vince McMahon recently created the XFL,
Clayton Acts. Between the two Acts, professional sports
which he bills as an exciting, extreme alternative to the
1
leagues, which deal everyday in balancing team comMeanwhile, the Women's Professional Football
NFL.
League (WPFL) will start its second season this year,
while women's volleyball had
edged closer to the professional ranks by gaining corporate
a
sponsorship and setting
2001 exhibition schedule.
Even professional men's basketball is getting into the
the
resurrecting
game,
Basketball
American
Association (ABA) to compete
with

the

Continental

Basketball Association (CBA)
and International Basketball
League (IBL) for minor league
fan support. For sports fans,
these new leagues represent

petitiveness with league unity, face critical legal traps
that must be avoided to ensure survival, let alone
5

The single-entity s5ports
enterprise features one
organizattional
central
body with which all of the
players in the leagu( econtract; this body ther 001
cates those players tbo the
respective teams. The
league itself is owned
equally and collectiv ely by
all teams and is acked
financially by inv( ~stors
who invest in the 1ieague
as a whole, rather ti1ifl in
individual teams.

expanded options for Friday
nights at the stadium or Sunday afternoons in front of
the tube, as well as the promise of the never-ending sea-

success.
The approach favored by new sports investors
is to structure the league as a single entity in
order to escape the reach of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. 6 The single-entity sports enterprise
features one central organizational body with
which all of the players in the league contract;
this body then allocates those players to the
respective teams. 7 The league itself is owned
equally and collectively by all teams and is backed
financially by investors who invest in the league
as a whole, rather than in individual teams. The
investors then operate individual teams and han-

dle local concerns. 8
This Note begins by introducing some of the
more

recently

founded

professional

sports

son.

leagues, identifying their background and single-entity
structures. It then provides a general background of
antitrust issues in sports, followed by explanations of

For attorneys, they may represent something different altogether. In Fraser v. Major League Soccer 2
Major League Soccer (MLS) faced an antitrust claim
brought by a group of players. The players alleged that
the league's corporate scheme, through which the

the possible defenses, including the single-entity structure. Next, it discusses Fraser as a potential landmark
case for professional sports leagues, showing how its
lessons contribute to the current mode of antitrust
analysis. Finally, this Note illustrates why single-enti-

owner-investors imposed various restraints on competition among the teams for players, violated the Sherman
Act. While the MLS has survived so far in Fraser, the
challenge refuses to go away, and the case is continuing
to work its way through the Massachusetts federal

ty structuring may be essential for leagues in their
infancy, but of little use to well-established professional
sports leagues.

court system.
Whatever its ultimate outcome, Fraser presents just
the latest of several lawsuits challenging the business
practices of the various professional sports leagues.

BASIC ANTITRUST LAW

Such a suit will commonly charge that the league
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act or Clayton Act, by allowing owners or teams to dicThe
tate collectively its rules and regulations. 3
Sherman Act covers monopolies or attempts to monopo-

restraint of trade or commerce;" 9 section 2 makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com10
bine or conspire ...to monopolize" trade or commerce.
Simply put, § 1 prohibits independent economic entities

lize as well as any contract, combination, or conspiracy
to restrain trade or commerce. 4 The Clayton Act, on the

GENERAL ANTITRUST BACKGROUND
Virtually every antitrust suit begins with the
Sherman Antitrust Act. Section 1 of the Act prohibits
"every contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy in

agreeing not to compete by artificially altering or fixing
the price or quality of their separate products.1 1 Most
§1 claims in sports involve alleged diminished competi-

s or's n
23

te

tion between member clubs of a league resulting from
league governance, rules of ownership, or franchise
restrictions. 12 Many of these cases involve a court
upholding a league's application of a rule, such as

exclusive dealings, and unilateral refusals to deal.

requiring supermajority approval of the league mem-

been brought since and even fewer vertical restraints

bers before a new club can be granted an expansion

have been held illegal. Thus, such activities are widely
used by businessmen, who can rely on judicial authori-

13

franchise or transfer majority ownership interest in a
14
member club.
However, §1 claims also arise over league player
restraints. 15

In

Continental T.V.. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, the Supreme
Court applied the "rule of reason" analysis, placing such
a difficult burden on plaintiffs that few claims have

ty to support their usefulness. 2 4 These claims are rare.
Also rare are claims under §2 of the Sherman Act.

Players sometimes allege that certain

The few existing §2 claims have involved upstart

league rules evidence a conspiracy by the member clubs
not to compete with each other with respect to players'
services. These rules often operate by either excluding
certain players from playing in the league or initially

leagues suing established leagues for monopolizing a
26
professional sport.2 5 In Swift & Co. v. United States,

allocating each player to a particular team and thereafter impeding his ability to sign with a different
team.16 Section 1 claims related to such rules have
addressed the legality of issues like league drafts and
17
minimum age requirements.

to determine if there was an attempt to monopolize,
Justice Holmes examined whether the company's plan
encompassed: (1) specific intent to control prices or
eliminate competition in some market; (2) predatory or
anti-competitive conduct directed at accomplishing this
unlawful purpose; and (3) a dangerous probability that
the conduct, if permitted to run its course, would create

involve agreements among competitors not to compete

Thus, §2 addresses three offenses:
a monopoly. 27
monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and combinations or conspiracies to monopolize. 28 The Swift Court

but to divide markets or customers, agreements that
are per se illegal.' 8 Such restraints include the classic
group boycott, that exists when a group of competitors

also noted that the mere existence of a monopoly is not
enough to establish a §2 claim; there must also be a
"willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as dis-

agree to take some form of joint action to exclude other
competitors from the market. 19 This boycott need not
be targeted at competitors to be per se illegal; the same

tinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or his' 29
toric accident.

finding can result from agreements that aim at customers and suppliers. 20 The Supreme Court dealt with
these issues on several occasions in the 1980s, relying

These two sections of the Sherman Act get intermingled in many claims. In United States v. Columbia

Section 1 claims may also be based on either "horizontal" or "vertical restraints." Horizontal restraints

on earlier precedent to hold that such activities are per
se illegal. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., v.

Steel Co., the Supreme Court stated: "[E]ven though the
restraint effected may be reasonable under §1, it may
constitute an attempt to monopolize forbidden by §2 if a

Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,21 the Supreme Court
found that concerted refusals to deal and group boycotts
"are so likely to restrict competition without any effi-

specific intent to monopolize may be shown." 30 Thus,
monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully
obtained, can be condemned under §2 even if not exer-

ciency gains that they should be condemned as per se
violations of [section] 1 of the Sherman Act." In an earlier case, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,

cised. However, violations of §2 often correlate to conduct that violates §1.31 In any case, in order to address
all possible violations, most claims plead violations of

the Supreme Court noted the need for a policy to eliminate maximum price-fixing agreements, stating "for

both Sherman Act sections.
In addition, most antitrust claims include reference

cripple the freedom of traders and

to the Clayton Act. This Act addresses actual practices

thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with
22
on faith in price competition as a market force."

restraining trade, including price discrimination and
purchase agreements among competitors, and provides
injunctive relief to injured parties. 3 2 Players with

Suits may also be maintained on the theory of vertical restraints. These restraints in sports would involve
non-pricing restrictions regarding location, customers,

Sherman Act claims also routinely invoke the Clayton
Act's §16 for injunctive relief "against the threatened
33
loss or damage by violation of the antitrust law."

such agreements

. . .

their own judgment . . .; [t]he per se rule is grounded
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Players can also sue for treble damages under §4 of the
Clayton Act, an attractive option especially when combined with injunctive relief for a Sherman Act antitrust
claim.

34

Whatever the claims made or statutes cited, current
commentators suggest that a new force has taken over
antitrust analysis. They suggest that the Supreme
Court now considers the policy goal of enhancement of
consumer welfare as the sole basis in deciding antitrust
cases. 3 5 Today, therefore, a proper antitrust inquiry
focuses solely on the economic effect a challenged practice has on consumers; whatever lowers prices and/or
increases the quantity and/or quality of what is being
produced is considered pro-competitive, reasonable, and
lawful.36
HISTORY

OF ANTITRUST

IN

MAJOR

PROFESSIONAL

SPORTS

Antitrust law has been applied to professional sports
Traditionally, the Supreme Court
since 1914. 3 7
approached the subject by finding various business
arrangements, including price fixing, market allocation,
group boycotts, and vertical territorial restrictions, per
se illegal. 38 Vague categories allowed the Court to condemn various forms of conduct that judges deemed per
se illegal, including various joint venture rules, regardless of the fact that they created better quality products
39
at lower prices for consumers.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court
altered its antitrust stance by limiting the applicability
of the per se rule. 40 In Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., the Court narrowed the per
se approach to price fixing, holding that a blanket
licensing arrangement for musical compositions which
achieved major cost savings to purchasers by making
individual composers unable to compete effectively did
41

Similarly, in
not automatically violate antitrust law.
limiting "group boycott" illegality in Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court decided that in order to find a per se antitrust violation with
respect to the restraint of trade, there must be evidence
of a "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue. '4 2 Northern Pacific Railway Co. was
followed twenty years later by the "rule of reason" factors established by the Supreme Court in National
43
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.
There, the Supreme Court, rejecting per se analysis for
a price ban on engineers bidding for projects, deter-

',,N
mined that an agreement is unlawful to the extent that
the anti-competitive injury it causes outweighs the pro44
competitive benefits it generates.
In general, the business of professional sports does
not lend itself to per se analysis, but is better characterized in terms of the reasonableness of the allegedly
restrictive practice. 4 5 In a 1984 case, NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 4 6 the Supreme
Court examined a plan in which the NCAA attempted to
set prices and limit each member school's television
exposure, essentially fixing prices by precluding negotiations among broadcasters and institutions. The Court
refused to apply the ordinary "illegal per se" approach to
this antitrust claim of horizontal price fixing and output
limitation. 4 7 Instead the Court chose to apply a "rule of
reason" test to examine the particular market context
because the "case involve[d] an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition [were] essential if the
'4 8
product [was] to be available at all."
Since then, the modern approach has been for courts
to use the "rule of reason" test in the professional sports
context. In doing so, courts first presume the anti-competitive effects of restrictions necessary, then examine
them to see if they impermissibly outweigh the resulting pro-competitive effects, if any.4 9 A thorough investigation of the industry under review and balancing of
the arrangement's positive and negative effects must be
taken; if those steps present insignificant effects on
competition with legitimate business justifications, the
50
challenged conduct does not violate antitrust laws.
This more deliberate inquiry for restrictions on player
mobility reflects the court's skepticism of restraints contrasted with its desire to refrain from the per se concept
because of the peculiar economics of the sports industry.5

1

Due to its unique antitrust exception, baseball has
been the most litigated sport with regards to antitrust
law application. Starting in 1922 with Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 52 the Supreme Court held
that baseball, as a personal effort not related to business production, did not constitute interstate commerce
53
and therefore was not subject to federal antitrust law.
In this case, the Court determined that baseball was a
purely state affair and the fact that the leagues "must
induce free persons to cross state lines and must
arrange and pay for their doing so [was] not enough to
change the character of the business." 54

In the numer-

s orts n te
ous baseball cases that followed, the Court rigidly
adhered to stare decisis and relied upon Congressional
passivity in keeping baseball as an anomalous excep55
tion to antitrust law.
Conflicts in professional league sports outside of
baseball did not reach courts until New Deal era case
law broadened the definition of interstate commerce,
allowing greater possibilities for antitrust violations
and the means for the Court to escape its contradictory
In Radovich v. NFL, for
treatment of baseball. 56
instance, the Supreme Court held that football was,
57

Around the
unlike baseball, subject to antitrust law.
same time period, lower courts ruled that issues in professional basketball, such as player mobility, could be
58

In the 1971 case
analyzed under antitrust law.
Haywood v. National Basketball Association, the
Supreme Court apparently agreed, noting in dicta that
59
basketball should be subject to federal antitrust law.
Although the NFL has limited exemptions for television deals,60 the only professional sports to maintain
player antitrust exemptions have been baseball and soccer. The 1998 Curt Flood Act removed these exemptions
for baseball. 6 1 Thus, only the MLS's antitrust exemp62
tion remains.
SINGLE ENTITY DEFENSE

The Supreme Court expounded the so-called singleentity theory in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe
Corp. 63 There, the Court held that a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary were incapable of an "agreement" within §1 of the Sherman Act. In Copperweld, a
corporation conspired with one of its wholly owned subsidiaries to exclude one of the subsidiary's competitors
from the market. The Copperweld Court recognized,
however, that such "agreements" did not deprive "the
marketplace of the independent centers of decision
64
making that competition assumes and demands."
Rather, it determined that these agreements merely
constituted a form of "unilateral behavior flowing from
the decisions of a single enterprise." 65 Thus, the singleentity structure would preserve existing independent
decision making when it exists but also classifying certain decisions as strictly unilateral decisions of a single
66
entity.
Thus repudiating the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine with respect to corporations and their
wholly owned subsidiaries, Copperweld also established
that one center of decision-making exists where a single

entity has the legal authority to control day-to-day
operations of all other entities. 6 7 The parent's legal control of the subsidiary preserves single-entity status
because the subsidiary will act for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder, in a unified economic interest. 68 The subsidiary of the corporation, although legally distinct, does not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act if, in
coordination with the corporation, it pursues these common interests of the whole rather than interests separate from those of the corporation itself.6 9 Moreover,
the Court went beyond the form of the business structure, examining the substance to determine whether
the agreement threatened competition. 70 In all, then,
the Copperweld test requires a court to determine if
there is a "complete unity of interest," such that the
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
have common objectives and agree to a single course of
action. 7 1

The two factors to consider are: (1) whether
the entity has a "complete unity of interests," 72 and (2)
whether the alleged act brings "formally independent
73
economic factors into a common plan."
So far, professional sports leagues trying to apply the
single entity defense in antitrust suits have failed. Two
notable failures in the early 1980s involve the NFL.
The first case, North American Soccer League (NASL) v.
NFL, 7 4 challenged the NFL's cross-ownership ban
under §1 of the Sherman Act. 7 5 NASL argued that an
agreement between members of the NFL to prohibit its
members from making or retaining any capital investment in any other league violated § 1 of the Sherman Act
as an attempt to "combine" or "conspire" since it served
as a group boycott in unreasonably restricting this pool
of investors. 76 The Second Circuit rejected the NFL's
single-entity argument and instead characterized the
league as a joint venture, due to its structure as an
unincorporated organization of twenty-eight individually owned teams. 77 While the court acknowledged that
the unique nature of professional sports requires economic cooperation and interdependence to ensure success, it pointed out that individual franchises possess
independent decision-making characteristics, as well as
separate profit and expense systems that cannot be
78
overlooked.
Later, in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
NFL, 7 9 the Ninth Circuit examined the NFL's singleentity defense under § 1 of the Sherman Act, attempting
to justify a league rule requiring approval by threefourths of the other teams for any member team to relo-

K, ,RE
cate to a new city. The court noted that immunizing the
NFL from §1 scrutiny would show a willingness to "tolerate such a loophole [as to] permit league members to
escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered
into by them that would benefit their league or enhance
their ability to compete even though the benefit would
be outweighed by its anti-competitive effects."8 0 Thus,
the court rejected the NFL's claims of single-entity
structure and held that all league conduct would satisfy the plurality requirement of a joint venture and the
"rule of reason" standard. 8 1
The Ninth Circuit based its decision in Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n on Supreme Court cases
dealing with single-entity and joint-venture theories in
other business areas. For example, Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States found divisions of markets
between competitors where sellers mutually agreed not
to invade each other's sales territories to be per se illegal. 8 2 After looking at Timken Roller Bearing, the
Ninth Circuit found other business organizations with
products equally unitary, requiring the same kind of
cooperation from the organization's members and thus
In Perma Life
violates §1 of the Sherman Act. 83
Mufflers. Inc., v. International Parts Corp., 8 4 the
Supreme Court reiterated its position that common
ownership is not sufficient to preclude the application of
§1 of the Sherman Act. As commentators note, however, the Ninth Circuit recognized an exception to conspiracy under §1 if "corporate policies are set by one
individual or by a
p a r e n t
corporation."

85

The

Supreme Court did
not deem cooperation sufficient to
preclude §1 scrutiny, and thus the
Ninth Circuit in Los
Angeles Memorial

RD \N
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n from the Supreme
Court's favorable decision in Copperweld, in McNeil v.
NFL. 88

In McNeil, NFL players whose contracts had
expired challenged the NFL's "Plan B" proposal to set
up a standard wage scale as a horizontal price-fixing
arrangement, a per se violation of §1 of the Sherman
Act. 8 9

The NFL contends the Copperweld decisionconcluding that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring-controls to immunize
its actions as a common enterprise engaged in the production and marketing of professional football from
antitrust liability. 90 The district court rejects the NFL's
"single economic entity" argument, relying on NASL
and Los Angeles Coliseum since the NFL's structure has
not changed since identical arguments were made in
91
those earlier cases.
Refusing to give up, the NFL asserted the single-entity defense against a §1 restraint of trade challenge to
the rule prohibiting an owner from selling shares of his
team to the public in Sullivan v. NFL. 9 2 The court stated that the common interests pursued by the parent
and subsidiary in Copperweld to form a single-entity
were not applicable to this case since the football teams
do not pursue common interests off the playing field,
more specifically in the market for ownership interests
at issue. 9 3 The court cited McNeil for the proposition
that Copperweld provides no help for the NFL and its
member clubs, established professional sports leagues
94
that tried to masquerade as corporations.

Any claim brought under §1 of the Sherman
Act will undoubtedly fail against a newer professional league such as the MLS, initially
organized as a single-entity corporation. If
§2 suits are brought against such leagues,
history dictates a finding of no violation, as
the claims brought under §2 of the Sherman
Act have had very little impact on the structure or operation of the sports industry. For
instance, to date, the predatory monopolization defense has had no effect on sports

Coliseum Comm'n
did not exempt the
86
NFL from scrutiny under §1 of the Sherman Act.

Rather, the court examined the facts, focusing on the
variance in profits and losses from team to team and the
fact that there are separate identities for marketabili87

ty.

The NFL tried the single-entity defense again, trying
to distinguish unfavorable holdings in NASL and Los

However,

any

claim

brought under §1 of the
will
Act
Sherman
undoubtedly fail against
professional
a
newer
league such as the MLS,
initially organized as a
single-entity corporation.
If §2 suits are brought
against such leagues, history dictates a finding of
no violation, as the claims

brought under §2 of the Sherman Act have had very little impact on the structure or operation of the sports
industry.95 For instance, to date, the predatory monopolization defense has had no effect on sports. 9 6 Courts
have found that any monopoly that one league might
have over another exists as a natural monopoly which
does not violate'antitrust laws since it does not use

s orts note
Although the singleexclusionary or unfair means.
entity defense did not work for the NFL, Copperweld

that would take place if each team could bid for and sign

"breathed some life into the single entity defense" and
provided hope for better results for the newer leagues'

restricts the players' ability to move one team to anoth-

97

defense.

98

FRASER V. MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER
By structuring itself as a single limited liability company, the MLS gives each team operator a financial
stake in the league as a whole, not just in an individual
team. Owner-investors share with the league local revenues while receiving dividends on profits from league
operations. 9 9 Player contracts are also owned by the
MLS rather than the individual team; the league

players directly.

This decision-making process also

er, hampering competition for their services.
However, the district court accepted the league's single-entity defense and granted summary judgement for
MLS, stating that the league could not be held liable for
concerted action among team operator-investors which
10 4
allegedly restrained their competition for players.
The district court stated that these single entities can
act unilaterally in ways that may, in some manner,
decrease competition without violating the Sherman
Act. 10 5 Referencing Copperweld, the court noted that
the formation of the limited liability company operating

assigns the players to certain teams and has options on
their contracts for two years after the contract expires.
In other words, under this structure, the teams really

in a professional soccer league created a new market,
increasing the number of competitors from zero to

only compete with each other in one place-on the field.
Under its current design, the MLS also has vast powers in areas outside players' services. The corporation

and abuse of market power since the MLS is an upstart
league trying to contend with premiere soccer leagues
in Europe that offer both higher quality compensation

can: (1) limit financial inequalities between large and
small teams; (2) gain economies of scale through cost

and competition. 107 However, the district court determined that there could be no Sherman Act claim "based

control and purchasing power; and (3) more closely regulate sponsorship, through a licensing program and
The MLS also controls a
integrated sponsorship.' 0 0
group license concerning the players, for which each

on concerted action among a corporation and its officers,
nor among officers themselves, so long as the officers

player receives a percentage of his annual salary. In
return, the league retains the ability to veto a player's
endorsement or commercial choices without additionally compensating the player under its standard player
contract. 10 1 Fraser presents the first challenge to this
MLS structure.
Fraser also provides the latest antitrust challenge to
the Copperweld single-entity defense. In Fraser, MLS
players sued the league, objecting to the reserve clause
and salary cap.

Like the NFL in previous cases, the

MLS responded merely by claiming to be "exempt."
The players denied the league's single-entity claims,
maintaining that the supposed single entity structure is
really just a "sham," that restricts player movement as
it prevents salary increases. 1 0 2 Since the MLS operates
with centralized control, and all of the investors share
in the returns of the league instead of an individual
team's income, 10 3 the players claim that the investors
who operate the MLS teams have combined to restrain
trade or commerce by contracting for player services
centrally.

In other words, using centralized decision-

making eliminates the competition for those services

one. 1 0 6

The players were unable to show the existence

are not acting to promote an interest, from which they
would directly benefit, that is independent from the corThe court stuck to the
poration's success." 10 8
Copperweld axiom that coordination of business activities within a single firm is not subject to § 1 scrutiny,
10 9
even if the unilateral activity tends to restrain trade.
Notably, the Fraser court followed the trend in professional sports of applying the "rule of reason" standard of scrutiny, followed by other cases in the First
Circuit. The First Circuit Court of Appeals had previously cautioned against applying the per se analysis too
readily to situations that do not fit the traditional
model: "A claim of boycott ...invites particular caution:
boycotts are not a unitary phenomenon." 110 Since the
courts have no experience with these restraints in the
professional sports realm, the exemption is currently
under examination by the court using a "rule of reason"
standard of scrutiny. The district court found that the
transfer fee rules requiring an out-of-contract player's
new club to pay a transfer fee to the player's former club
were not per se violations of the Sherman Act's prohibition against restraint of trade.11 1 In reaching this decision, the Fraser court chose to balance the anti-competitive player effects on competition in one market with
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most successful franchise, in December due to an inabilthe pro-competitive consumer benefits in other mar11 2
ity to find new investors during the two years the operkets.
ating rights have been for sale. 12 1 There have been no
Looking at the implications of the decision, Fraser
new investors since 1997.122
appears factually indistinguishable from Copperweld so
Persuaded by the league's arguments, the jury ended
the Massachusetts court is able to apply Copperweld
the twelve-week trial with a unanimous verdict finding
analysis. Indeed, the MLS and its shareholders wholly
that MLS is not a monopoly. 12 3 After the April ruling
own the franchises and thus should not be subject to §1
liability based on concerted actions.11 3 Since player
contracts are owned by the MLS, which also conducts
the draft, § 1 of the Sherman Act does not apply since no
other party exists to meet the requirement of a conspiracy in restraint of trade. 11 4 Therefore, the league's
owner-operators could not be found to have conspired
with each other so as to subject themselves to the
Sherman Act. This argument against concerted action
appears stronger since many of the investor-operators
own multiple teams and would damage their investments in one team by spending freely for another

that the single-entity structure was both legal and proper, the verdict confirmed the legality of the United
States Soccer Federation's designation decision. The
jury determined that players can move to foreign
leagues and that there was not enough demand for
more than one top-level professional soccer league in
the United States.1 2 4 United States soccer kept its support from the international federation with this ruling.
However, the MLS players' attorney, who is also attorney for the NFL Players Association (which funded the
suit), plans to appeal again.125

team.1 1 5

Fraser thus legitimates Copperweld and
extends it to the professional sports leagues, a nontraditional market.
Jury deliberations for the latest trial started
December 7th. In the words of the players' attorney,
"[t]he future of soccer, in a very real sense, is what the
jury is going to be deciding."'1 6 MLS Commissioner
Don Garber agrees that the case will have a great
impact on soccer but states that "[t]he single-entity is
an important case for all sports ... [w] e are fighting for
the right to determine how to run our business."1 1 7 In
the end, it took only one day of jury deliberation to produce a unanimous verdict in favor of the MLS. l l 8 The
key issue was whether the MLS constituted an illegal
monopoly designed to depress salaries. Central to that
question is the effect a second league would have on
MLS, an issue over which the parties disagree. The
players' attorney claimed that MLS is reliant on a lack
of competition, basing its salary structure on the lack of
alternatives available to players to earn other amounts.
MLS countered that players are free to work in other
11 9

countries.
MLS also claimed a second league would drive them
to bankruptcy, pointing to $250 million in purported
losses since the league's inception in 1995 as evidence
negating monopoly claims. Due to these monetary concerns cited in the lawsuit, the 2001 schedule consists of
twenty-eight instead of thirty-two regular-season
games, and is two weeks shorter than in previous
years. 120 The league even took over D.C. United, the

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LEAGUES AS
PROPOSED SINGLE ENTITIES
THE WNBA
Perhaps the most successful of the newer professional leagues, the Women's National Basketball
Association (WNBA) has emerged as one of the dominant players in the growing market for professional
women's sports. During the 2000 regular season, 2.3
million fans, an average of over nine thousand per
game, attended WNBA events. Like fan interest, the
league itself has been growing; its initial core of eight
teams has doubled to sixteen, with four new additionsthe Indiana Fever, Miami Sol, Portland Fire, and
Seattle Storm-coming just last year. Two new teams
joined the league for play this year-the Orlando
Miracle and the Minnesota Lynx. 1 2 6 The WNBA has
also been busy in the contractual area, signing a fouryear agreement extending through the 2002 season
with its players' union, as well as expanded television
12 7
deals with ESPN and Lifetime for the 2001 season.
WNBA programming has been added to television on
Thursday and Friday nights, as well as Sunday afternoons. 128
WUSA
Hoping to take advantage of fan interest in the
recent Women's World Cup, John Hendricks, founder of
the Discovery Channel, heads a group planning to start
a professional women's soccer league known as WUSA.

nors
te
Eight initial teams set to begin play on April 14, 2001
are backed by eight investors,

1 29

each of whom have put

up $5 million for the rights to operate one or more franchises and get local television rights. Each franchise
will have a twenty-woman roster, partially consisting of

teams are organized as an association spanning from
Connecticut to Washington, with approximately forty
owners. 13 7 Nevertheless, the league is low-profile and
even lower-budget; six of the nine teams have consistently lost money. 13 8
Salaries range from a paltry

three members of either the U.S. National Team or 1999
champion World Cup team who have already been
assigned. In addition, the league is holding an interna-

$30,000 to $50,000 per year as compared to the $2.2
million average in NBA players' salaries in 1997-

tional draft, a college draft, and tryouts at a national
combine in Florida.130

sale to Thomas, as the original forty owners of the nine
cash-strapped franchises sold all assets of their teams

All of the members of the 1999 World Cup Champion

to the ex-Detroit Pistons star while staying on as

team signed to play with the league. Each team may
have up to four foreign players. The teams will play a
twenty-game schedule, with some games scheduled as

"investor-owners." 140 This relinquishment of control
over teams individually allows equal financing opportunities for all teams, eliminating the disparities in
finances among the teams.

double-headers with the men's professional league,
MLS. Salaries will begin at $25,000 and range up to
$80,000 for marquee players from the 1999 World Cup
Squad. 13 1 The salary cap limit is set at $800,000 per
13 2
team, for a $40,000 per player salary average.
THE

XFL

Owned equally by the WWF and NBC, Vince
McMahon's new $80 million dollar league just started
play February 3, 2001.133 The initial eight teams are
owned by a WWF subsidiary, and players will be under
contract with the league rather than with specific
teams. Although no immediate expansion plans exist,
the league states an interest in Canada, with Toronto
13 4
having been mentioned as a possible expansion city.
Both NBC and the WWF plan to cross-promote the
XFL during their programming, but the league itself
will remain in control of all advertising inventory sold
during broadcasts. Salaries also fall under league control. Players will receive the same salaries over the ten

1998.139

Financial hardships ultimately motivated the

Essentially Thomas has attempted to transform his
new league into a single-entity similar to the WNBA
and MLS, rather than the NBA's or NFL's joint venture
concept. 1 4 1 The league will handle all areas of all
teams' operations, including player contract negotiations and marketing, except the hiring of local administrative staff and general managers. 14 2 If, for instance,
there is a need to move a franchise or replace the existing management of a team, the league maintains the
control to make this decision. Each team's "investorowner" would have a financial stake in the league as a
whole but would possess little decision-making power.
Budgets would be strict and all expenses and revenues
shared, including insurance and worker's compensation. 1 43 Salaries would be kept artificially low compared to the NBA and IBL, and salary caps could be
strictly enforced as players sign standard contracts with
1 44
very little variance and are assigned to their teams.
Thus, players' salaries are determined by the league's

game season, but the winning teams each week will
share in a victory bonus pool, a $100,000 jackpot to be

valuation of their worth. Thomas believes the structure

split by the thirty-eight players on the winning team
after each game. The salaries are determined by posi-

pare expenses, and aid in soliciting corporate mar14 5
keters.

tion, with quarterbacks receiving between $50,000 and
$55,000 at the high end of the pay scale and kickers
receiving about $35,000 at the low end of the pay scale.
All other players receive $45,000.135

All of these plans have been put in jeopardy by
Thomas' recent acceptance of the head coaching job with

will lead to better competitive balance among teams,

the Indiana Pacers. By mandate of the NBA, Thomas

Acquired in 1999 by Isiah Thomas, the fifty-five year

placed his ownership interest in the CBA into a blind
trust, where it will reside until it can be sold. 1 46 The latest proposal includes the sale of the CBA to the IBL,
resulting in a merger of the two leagues and subsequent

old Continental Basketball Association (CBA), will

folding of the least financially successful franchises in

serve as the official referee and player developmental
league of the NBA through 2001.136 The nine current

these leagues. 14 7 Trustee Ivan Thornton and Isiah

THE CBA

Thomas will not comment, but Thomas will likely lose a
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promulgating the restraints. 154 Following Supreme
Court precedent set in Northwest Wholesale Stationers
and Maricopa County Medical Society, the league's
attempts to establish maximum prices under a salary

significant amount of the $10 million he investec
148
chase the CBA.
HANDLING POSSIBLE ANTITRUST C.
AGAINST THE NEW LEAGUE
Should players wish to challenge any new
organized as single-entities, the basis for many
challenges would be the one that failed in Frasei
ly that the league is really a group of separate economic parties acting in combination
in restraint of trade. While each team will

cap should be illegal per se with no further inquiry.
Courts have not been persuaded by the counter-argument that the per se rule should not apply because the
judiciary has little antitrust experience in the industry
15 5
at issue.
players wish to challenge any As noted,

operate independently regarding personnel
and facilities issues, the league office for both
the WUSA and XFL, as well as the CBA,
plans to negotiate player contracts, handle

Should
new leagues organized as single-entities,
the basis for many of these challenges
would be the one that failed in Fraser,
namely that the league is really a group of
separate economic parties acting in combination in restraint of trade.

marketing and endorsement deals, and deal
1 49
with other organizational issues.
Under the CBA player contracts, players fall
strict salary cap, the rules of which are only k:
the CBA officials. 1 50 Under §1 of the Sherman,

the league's
overwhelmg
n
i
restraints
on

trade

and

price

might disqualify it as a single entity since "you can't create separate markets and get all the advantages of individual
ownership and then price fix on salaries." 15 6 In Fraser,
the soccer players maintain that the single entity struc-

salary cap, as well as the centralized player al
system and standard reserve clause, will preve
teams from freely competing for the services of
vidual player, violating federal antitrust law.

ture violates §1 of the Sherman Act, preventing salary
increases and restricting player movement in an
attempt to limit players' legal challenges to weak §2
claims. 1 57 Since they lost their suit, any of the new
leagues' possible §1 claims seem destined to fail.
The only possible effective claims against the single-

players also face a strict $800,000 team salary
centralized player allocation system. 1 51 Thus, t
ers in both leagues can assert Sherman Act §1
of player restraint due to the restriction of ti

entity defense for the CBA or XFL players when fighting their ownerships' internal decision-making processes would be §2 claims of monopolization. 1 58 However,
the claims of a CBA or XFL attempt to monopolize

market and their ability to move from team
after assignment to a certain team. 152 The s
league contract the CBA players are forced to s
hibit them from shopping their services and

would be difficult to prove because players would first
have to show that the relevant product and geographic
market is the labor market for elite professional basketball or football players in the United States. 1 59 This

any other team and leaves them with salaries L
ally determined by a league official. Their only
tive is to sign with an IBL club, which will lin
chances to "graduate" to the NBA. The wome
WUSA do not even have an alternative since i

task would be difficult for either league's player since
the truly elite basketball players play in the NBA just
as the truly elite football players play in the NFL.
The CBA and XFL players would also have trouble

women's professional soccer league exists.
As seen through the creation of Major Leagu
clubs, "star" players in single entity leagues o
claimed to be given the chance to influence the

proving under §2 that, if the CBA and XFL were considered monopolistic leagues imposing wage restrictions that depressed their wages by a significant
amount, they would have no option but to sign with the
CBA or XFL. 1 60 The IBL offers an alternative to playing in the CBA, as do other roughly equivalent profes-

nation while other players do not have similar,
nities. 15 3 The XFL and the CBA have no such
since neither league attracts such "star player
prevention from any choice could constitute a
Act §1 group boycott "being exercised by unrela
petitors refusing to do business" with the playei
the agreements were under the authority

sional basketball leagues around the world. Similarly,
XFL players could play in the Canadian Football
League or the Arena Football League. Since these other
244

s ;or s n te

leagues do exist, neither the CBA nor the XFL would
probably garner the minimum fifty percent of the professional basketball and football market respectively
required to prove market power, much less any abuse of
16 1
It
that power, so any §2 claim would be dismissed.

player mobility.162
Union success in standardizing
wages and organizing the players ultimately affects
price competition among the teams and allows them the
powerful tools of strikes and boycotts effectively used by
163
other leagues to challenge unfair salaries.

would likewise be hard to prove that a restraint on the
players by any CBA or XFL decisions were not just
ancillary to an overall legal agreement of the CBA or
XFL teams acting together as a single entity to produce

Another option is to form an association to challenge
any suspected antitrust practices. Associations do not
subject themselves to the restrictive procedural process
unions face since they deal with the National Labor

professional basketball or football.
The players' best legal strategy to address such
future issues would be to form a union, which would
have wide latitude under the Clayton Act to challenge
antitrust practices. The nonstatutory labor exemption

Relations Board upon first bringing charges and then
simply wait for the ruling. 164 An association would
bypass four or five years of legal wrangling by avoiding
the government, a strategy the NBA players used dealing with their recent 1998 lockout.165

in antitrust law shields the results of these union collective bargaining activities from scrutiny after "goodfaith and arms-length negotiation between the employer and the union on mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining," such as wages, hours, and restrictions on

Although a lockout normally works to exempt owners
from antitrust law, a simple claim by a Players
Association that it is not a labor union that acts as the
exclusive bargaining agent, but rather an association
just acting to represent the players, can gain the play-
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generate more revenue for owners, claiming an entitleThis threat keeps the
ers access to antitrust laws.
ment to some of the increased revenue. They will
owners and players' association negotiating frantically
attempt to challenge the existing single-entity structure
to avoid lawsuits, as seen by the all-night work sessions
using some of the claims stated previously. However,
in the NBA lockout. For these reasons, a blanket
the WUSA and XFL should prevail.
exemption from the Sherman Act and antitrust liability
In examining the pro-competitive effects, Hendricks
is desirable when determining a league's structure to
and McMahon meet the requisite unity of ownership
defend against these antitrust claims.
interest and totality of control of the WUSA and XFL
The WNBA, the only fledgling women's professional
respectively that the MLS needed to assert its successleague, has flourished arguably because the players
ful single entity defense. As a single-entity, these
formed the Women's National Basketball Players
leagues would enjoy immunity from §1 of the Sherman
Association (WNBPA), which has been able to bargain
Antitrust Act since they would be "incapable of contract,
successfully with the WNBA president. According to
combination, or conspiracy." 1 74 The sharing of expensWNBA President Ackerman, the four-year agreement,
es and profits proposed by these leagues under their
as detailed above, "reflects our commitment to providproposed structures further insulates them from liabiliing WNBA players with a first-class working environty.
ment. '' 16 7 The players' association director of operaIn Fraser, the court notes that player contracts are
tions also agreed that the deal was "a significant step
owned by MLS, who also conducts the draft such that
forward for WNBA players in many respects, including
§l's "conspiracy of combination in restraint of trade"
salaries, job security, and benefits." 168 Thus, the XFL
does not apply.1 7 5 Therefore, the league's owner-operaand WUSA should form an association to handle these
tors could not be found to have conspired with each
topics of negotiation, the sensitive topics which have
other in violation of the Sherman Act. Similarly, the
prompted antitrust suits in the past when players have
XFL, WNBA, and WUSA own the player contracts and
not had an association and felt powerless to bargain
conduct the drafts in isolation. Moreover, treating these
with the professional sports league corporation.
three new leagues as single-entities will advance "conAny suit against the WNBA, XFL, or WUSA with
sumer welfare," the main purpose of antitrust laws, and
these antitrust notions of uncompetitive restraint
is thus justified for policy reasons. 176 The single-entiactions could be defended on Copperweld's single-entity provides parity, preventing the wealthy teams from
ty theory, 16 9 as currently formulated by Fraser. Under
signing the best players, only to attract even more fans,
the "rule of reason" standard applied to these antitrust
bring in even more revenue, and make the gap between
cases, the court examines "consumer output" and "undi1 77
them and the rest of the league even larger.
minished welfare," both of which provide valid policy
Along with the parity arguments made in Fraser, the
reasons for these three leagues to be treated as a single
WUSA, WNBA, and XFL could also argue that the litentity exempt from antitrust laws. 1 70 The "rule of reamus test for antitrust legality applying the "rule of reason" approach weighs the nature and purpose of the
son" standard is undiminished output, with the output
rule, its effect on competitors and on competition, and
1 78
of the teams defined as each league game played.
the existence of less restrictive alternatives to the
Applying this rationale, only decisions designed to
approach adopted. 1 7 1 The true test of legality is
reduce the number of games would threaten "consumer
whether the restraint imposed merely regulates compe2
17
welfare" and violate antitrust rules. Therefore, this
tition, or in fact suppresses or destroys it.
alignment would not be illegal under antitrust law since
The WUSA will run risks in operating the team as a
there is no indication of a reduction in the number of
single entity. Hendricks does not run the same risk of
games scheduled.
losing players that the CBA does, as players could easi1 66

ly defect to the IBL or ABA or even to foreign markets
after their new chance at increased exposure to NBA
scouts fades. 173 McMahon similarly risks losing players to the Canadian Football League or Arena Football
League. These players will resist playing for such low

NECESSITY OF SINGLE-ENTITY STRUCTURE
FOR START-UP LEAGUES
The Fraser outcome is a necessity for struggling and
start-up professional sports leagues who must form a

salaries if these new leagues become more popular and

corporation in order to survive. These new sports
246

S
leagues need the added flexibility that the single-entity
organization provides because they are often sports that
have not been tested before in the United States. These
sports need the opportunity for financial security in
order to build a fan base which will bring continued
financial success. For soccer, the single-entity corporate
structure will allow a sport with proven
international success and fan appeal to "win
over the American spectator and television
viewer . . . [and contend] with the fact that
every other attempt at establishing a premier league in the United States has
failed."1 7 9 Women gain opportunity to play
professional basketball and soccer through

orts n te

1 82
and diminished the on-field sports product.
Allowing the single-entity structure recognizes the need
to keep competitive balance in professional sports;

absent restraints on player mobility, there arises a lack
of sufficient capital to build these leagues, forcing cancellation of proposed plans or bankruptcy. 18 3 Under the

Ma
iy players understand the effects
playir
ig in a single-entity league will
have
on their potential salary.
have
Never 'theless, they play as an opportunity t
o create exposure for themselves
and
their sport, and to create a
foothc
)ld for the sport in the American
profeE
;sional sports market.

the development of the WNBA and WUSA,
leagues that would not be possible without single-entity
structure due to a lack of immediate high demand for

women's professional sports. Since there is not a tradition of success with women's professional sports that
can guarantee immediate financial success, the singleentity structure allows the chance for success in the
United States which can serve as a pattern for the rest
of the world. Operating the new leagues as single-entities provides a unified league interest in financial success in the critical early stages where past leagues have
gone bankrupt. League office decisions keep each team
insulated from monetary pressures that lead to rash
financially alluring decisions which undermine the
integrity of the league and hurt rapport with the fans.

si

n g

Ie

-

entity system, management
maintains
control

over player movement and
thus can distribute the talent, ensuring parity that will
create competitive matches. 1 8 4 This control over costs
and balance on the field allows the single-entity league
to create sufficient revenue streams early that will
enable the league to pay increasingly higher salaries
and compete with established leagues. 1 8 5 Decisions not
affecting players are also made by the single-entity
league's central office. This keeps individual teams
from making decisions that benefit only their club to the
detriment of the league as a whole. 1 8 6 The single-entity league can also control issues such as realignment
and relocation, as well as changes in investment in each
team.
Under antitrust precedent, courts seem reluctant to

Goodwill needs to be developed because current fan support cannot endure lockouts or other tactics related to

break up organizations using reasonable business practices which also protect against bankruptcy, especially if

monetary concerns that arise when players bargain

there is no tradition to cite for such action.1

180

with leagues.

Restrictions such as a "no free agency"

clause and salary caps minimize team costs and maximize the salary of the average player while keeping
ticket prices low.18 1

Revenue-sharing allows each

squad to have more balanced teams, producing parity
on the field.
All of these factors promote organizational flexibility,
providing justification for the single-entity structure.
This structure, with its cost control strategies, provides
newer leagues with their only real chance at avoiding

87

Barring

a successful player appeal from Fraser, the single-entity structure helps the newest leagues avoid facing
responsibility for player restraints under antitrust
laws. Especially critical is the value of the sponsorship
agreements that the league is able to take advantage of
as a whole, without competition among the teams that
dilutes the financial value of the sponsor's investment.1 8 8 The single-entity corporation itself absorbs the

the bankruptcy problems associated with failed leagues.
Creating a single-entity would have been a practical

extra costs so team operators save a great deal of time
and money looking for sponsors they can then use to
focus on building fan support critical to stabilizing a
189
new league at the developmental stage.

solution to the North American Soccer League's (NASL)

Many players understand the effects playing in a

and United States Football League's (USFL) problems
where the profligate ways of its biggest market teams

single-entity league will have on their potential salary.
Nevertheless, they play as an opportunity to create

relegated smaller market teams to second-class status

exposure for themselves and their sport, and to create a
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foothold for the sport in the American professional
sports market. For the MLS, the single-entity structure
is imperative for keeping a place within FIFA and staying eligible for FIFA-sponsored tournaments such as
the 1994 World Cup Tournament that provided the
greatest exposure to major soccer in the United
States. 190 For women, the single-entity is imperative
for providing them an opportunity to even play professional sports.
Arguably, well-established professional leagues could
benefit from the single-entity structure as well. Owners
in well-established professional leagues resist the
appeal to relinquish control of their long-term investments for the common good of the sport. However, such
relinquishment would allow an equality of financing
aimed at eliminating obstacles for less wealthy teams.
The large economic disparities between large and small
market teams would be reduced if the league could
"purchase" each team for its appraised value and "sell"
it back to its original owner at the new value estimated
after revenue sharing. Furthermore, teams in debt
could finance earnings through future income, while
retaining control over all local broadcasting contracts
and sharing the national and local broadcasting revenues equally with the league. 1 9 1 A corporate league
could be created with franchises either owned directly
by this league or considered subsidiaries wholly owned
by the parent league corporation. 19 2 As a corporate
league, no §1 liability exists, so there is greater flexibility to adopt new rules, increase sponsorships, and enter
into new arrangements with players. 19 3 Even the problem of taxation (owners can currently deduct operating
losses of their original franchises) could be remedied as
an internal league decision allowing some owners' tax
gains to compensate other owners' losses. 194 The parity on the field and on the teams' financial reports would
mirror each other as signs of stability and balance
throughout the league.
Ultimately, although capable of producing a desirable
competitive balance, the single-entity structure loses its
viability for popular established professional sports.
Owners-who are actually considered "owner-operators" under the single-entity system-lose financial
incentive to improve their clubs since they cannot
expect to realize higher earnings upon future success. 19 5 Under the single-entity system, owners would
have difficulty maximizing profits since the free agency
system is not allowed. Free agency allows owners to

RDN
pay huge costs to free agent players with the hopes that
revenues generated by these players will exceed the
1 96
costs of their salaries, but this is not allowed.
Owners also worry about losing their tax-favored status. Currently they deduct the operating losses of their
individual franchises, which would not be allowed
under reorganization as a single-entity league. These
disadvantages seem more important to individual owners within the well-established professional sports
leagues than the advantages a single entity structure
provides.
Reorganizing existing leagues into single-entities
presents problems from a policy standpoint. If this
structure is allowed for the traditional sports, antitrust
issues will revert back to the Federal Baseball Club era,
in which the courts refuse to recognize professional
sports as a business conducting interstate commerce
open to antitrust claims. 1 9 7 It is also unrealistic to
expect courts to agree to changes in the corporate structure. In accordance with past litigation from the 1970s
striking down judicially created antitrust immunity,
courts will still be reluctant to allow existing professional sports teams to reorganize as single-entities.
Members in well-established professional sports
leagues must accept antitrust responsibility for
restraints entered into by them that would benefit them
as a whole but be detrimental to the players.
Commentators agree that changing the existing laws
for well-established professional leagues would undermine players' associations involving a large number of
players to satisfy a small number of wealthy
investors. 19 8 Players deserve the bargaining power
they currently enjoy and to change the system would
arguably be unfair to them. Such a change in league
structure is unlikely since it would probably not survive
a challenge from the players' association worried about
losing available section 1 claims as collective bargaining
99
leverage. 1
CONCLUSION
Professional sports leagues asserting the single-entity defense in antitrust suits have consistently failed.
However, the WUSA should be able to ride the coattails
of the tentative outcome of Fraser if antitrust challenges arise due to the structuring of the women's professional sports. Hendricks's structuring of WUSA as a
single-entity is a legally sound method of arrangement
in order to achieve financial success.

s orts nr
New professional sports leagues are wary of antitrust
law due to large amount of money at stake. Defending
against player challenges to the league practices and
the amount players can take if they win costs large
amounts of money that new, struggling start-up profes-

te

smaller market teams, setting uniform cost control policies, and providing an integrated sponsorship system.
Although capable of producing a desirable competitive balance, the single-entity structure loses its viability for popular established professional sports. An eco-

sional leagues do not have. Thus, organizing in a typi-

nomic perspective shows the single entity's effect of

cal manner where it would be vulnerable to charges of
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act would drive the

equalizing revenue could actually have a detrimental
effect. Disadvantages to owners of losing tax-favored

league to bankruptcy.
Previous league failures in bankrutpcy provide valu-

status and loss of incentives to improve clubs in order to
succeed and earn more individually are critical and
seem more important to well-established professional
sports leagues than the advantages a single entity

able lessons for these new leagues, which see many
benefits in organizing as single-entities. The traditional
method in which teams compete against each other for

structure provides.

the media, sponsors, and player contracts takes away

The trend in the courts is to strike down immunity

an ability to get unified concessions from owners and
players in the best interests of the league. If team oper-

grants in antitrust that previously existed. Thus, there
are unlikely to be any new immunity grants that would
require existing leagues to reorganize into single-enti-

ators own a financial stake in the league as a whole and
the league itself owns player contracts, the only place
where any true competition takes place is on the playing field. The league corporation also makes necessary
decisions quickly without having to build a consensus.
The single-entity structure enhances opportunities for
survival and eventual growth in new professional sports
leagues by creating financial parity between larger and

1 Associated Press, WWF's McMahon Forming XFL, at
http://espn.go.com/moresports/news/2000/0203/332510.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2000).

Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass.
2000).
2

3 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1-7 (1988).
The
Sherman Act has been challenged numerous times by professional sports leagues, including: Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972) (noting merit in consistency in deciding to uphold baseball's general antitrust exemption fifty years after it was
established even after holding that baseball was a business
and was engaged in interstate commerce); NBA v. Williams,
45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that antitrust laws have no
application to collective bargaining negotiations between
appellants and the NBA teams but that, even if they did
apply, they would survive scrutiny under the rule of reason
standard); Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major
League Players' Assn., 532 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1977) (players'
contracts encompassing only a limited right to renewal due to
the personal nature of employment relationships and therefore Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally became baseball's
first free agents by using national labor laws instead of federal antitrust laws under which baseball was still exempt);
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (subjecting the
Rozelle Rule, which provided that when a player's contract to
a team expires and he signs with a different club, the new
club must compensate the former club, to antitrust laws since
it was not a product of genuine arm's-length bargaining and
thus the non-statutory labor exemption was not applicable);
and McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992)(holding

ties. There is no need to change a system that already
works to the detriment of both players and owners.
However, courts should follow Fraser and allow new
professional sports leagues such as the WUSA, XFL,
and WNBA to use the single-entity structure as an economic necessity for getting started and developing support.

that the league and member clubs were capable of conspiring
for purposes of antitrust law and that these laws applied to
restraints operating solely within a labor market but professional players were given standing to challenge a league-wide
wage scale imposed by the owners).
4 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890's two

main provisions are:
§1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared
to be illegal.
§2: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty.
5 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Services Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 761 (1984) (If the league is organized and functioning as
a single-entity, it cannot be found subject to antitrust laws for
competing against itself under §1. Thus, only §2 claims could
apply to the conduct of a single entity, unlawful only when it
threatens actual monopolization. §2 claims are preferable
since §1 claims regarding concerted activity are judged more
sternly than §2 claims applicable to unilateral activity.).
6 Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149, 152
(S.D.N.Y 1974); San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey
League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (Regarding
assertions that professional sports leagues should be treated
as single-entities to avoid antitrust laws involving these
agreements, the few cases addressing the issue have simply
assumed that league members did not qualify since they were
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capable of agreement and the challenged conduct by the
league members was found to have no anti-competitive
effects.).

31 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1910).

7 Rob Atherton, Fraser v. Major League Soccer: The Future of

33 15 U.S.C. § 26.
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35 Uberstine, supra note 11, § 19.02 at 19-4.
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Club. Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,351 F. Supp. 462
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17 See Smith v. Pro Football. Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C.
1976).
18 See Antitrust Basics § 6.01, 6-1 (Thomas V. Vakerics ed.,
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19 Id., § 6.03 at 6-7.
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